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Introduction 
 
 Does the Capability Approach provide new insights into the difficult question of the 
effectiveness of law? In particular, might it allow us to assess the effectiveness of social 
rights – those so-called ‘second-generation’ rights which characterise the Welfare State? 
The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. When used with imagination, Amartya Sen’s 
Capability Approach supplies a fruitful heuristic framework for an enquiry into the 
effectiveness of social rights, and notably those European social rights whose hesitant 
emergence allows us to hope for the development of a European power at the service of the 
freedom of individuals. We take the Capability Approach as a liberal theory of positive 
freedoms which gives meaning to social rights as well as political and civil rights (Sen, 
2004). .  
 
 Everybody knows the current high level of citizens’ disaffection with the European 
Union. Europe is now seen – not without reason – as destructive of personal freedoms. It 
has become the vehicle of (alleged) economic necessity without also offering each citizen 
new possibilities of self realisation. For many people, European Law is just a competition 
law opening new markets without creating new effective freedoms. It is framed by negative 
freedoms instead of positive liberties. The word ‘Europe’ has become synonymous with the 
restriction of the space of opportunities and with the absence of choice. In this unfortunate 
situation, the European project is divorced from democracy. The emergence of European 
social rights offers a glimmer of hope, one which we should neither exaggerate nor 
underestimate. The evaluation of these rights calls for a theoretical framework that allows 
us to grasp the complexity of the processes at work. 
 
 We will proceed in three stages in order to sketch a brief outline of this evaluation 
of social rights. 
 
 First, we will say a few words on a theoretical displacement required by a definition 
of rights as capabilities. The law must therefore be considered as a space generating valued 
possible worlds offered to the freedom of individuals. We will make clear how rights-as-
capabilities may be understood according to two meanings that must always be intertwined 
to give them their full signification, namely as orientation of meaning and as resource. 
 
 On the basis of these two aspects we will then attempt to outline what a theory of 
the effectiveness of rights-as-capabilties might be, by applying it to a privileged example: 
the 1996 European Directive giving all citizens of the European Union a right to parental 
leave. As is well known, the effectiveness of a right created at the European level is 
produced in a very complicated way since it demands translation and implementation at 
lower political levels (national, regional) or at different levels of production of norms 
(parliaments, social dialogue). In what follows, we will limit ourselves to the 
implementation of this Directive in Belgium.  
 
 The first line of analysis consists initially in a hermeneutics of the meaning of 
rights.  
 
 The second line is an analysis of access to resources created by the law. In each 
case we will state how the relationship between the right and the capabilities of individuals 
can be understood.  
 
 Finally, we will emphasise the importance of the contextual factors of conversion of 
rights in real-life use. We will see that the effectiveness of a European social right such as 
the one giving universal access to parental leave is a rather fragile effectiveness, one that 
requires the mobilisation of numerous intermediary agents. If, as is desirable, the European 
Union at its level wishes to give more weight to the creation of social rights, and hence to 
renew in a real sense its link with the democratic project, it must concern itself more with 
the conditions for effectiveness of the rights it claims to promote. In this respect, the 
Capability Approach could structure an ‘informational basis’ (in Sen’s sense) that would be 
useful in the necessary and difficult renewal of the EU’s public action.  
 
Law as a space for generating possibilities 
 
 In order to grasp the impact of the Capability Approach on our notions of the 
effectiveness of law we need first of all to stress the introduction into the very theory of law 
of the idea of possibility. This is clearly often implicit in theories of law, but is not 
adequately examined in itself. In law and in discourse on law the category of possibility is 
too often obscured, or even overwhelmed, by the category of obligation (or its negative 
version, prohibition). The simplification of law to a catalogue of obligations and 
prohibitions is certainly the natural course of legal practice: in practice, we have recourse to 
the law in order to know what we must do and what we may not do. The definition of what 
is permissible seems to be a logical result of these constraints. But the possible is not 
reduced merely to the permissible according to the rules of the ‘deontic’ framework – as 
the logics of norms would put it – which links, by means of purely formal and deductive 
rules, the permissible, the obligatory, the prohibited and the optional. Not everything which 
is allowed is possible! If law is thought of in the order of the possible, its effectiveness is 
no longer confined by the deontic framework. To approach rights as positive liberties (and 
not just as negative liberties) is, then, to agree to evaluate the very complex relationship 
which places the space of the permitted in tension with the space of the possible. 
 
 We should certainly not underestimate the importance of the category of obligation 
in the logical structure of an entitlement. An entitlement always presents in one aspect the 
structure of an obligation. The right of one person imposes an obligation on another: the 
right of the tenant is the obligation of the landlord, the right of the wife is the obligation of 
the husband, the right of the child is the obligation of the parent, and so on. The provision 
of a right is most often evoked in these dyadic terms. But, in reality, this dyadic 
relationship is dependent on a triadic relationship. If a client truly has a right with regard to 
a vendor then it us up to the proper authority and not just the vendor to make sure that the 
right is respected. The State is therefore the third partner in the structure of obligation that 
characterises a right. In this respect it has often been noted that social rights, which by their 
very nature are open and are not clearly limited, could not claim to have a real status as 
‘right’ since the corresponding obligations always seem to be contextual and therefore 
highly variable, uncertain, floating. Legal reasoning likes concepts with sharp outlines, 
concepts that allow a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question of whether an obligation exists, 
and that allow us to discover what the clear and distinct criteria of the basis of the 
obligation are, and what the obligation consists of. On the basis of this vagueness, some 
people deduce that social rights do not exist at all. Sen (2004 : 338-342) does not fall into 
this trap: an ‘imperfect’ duty remains a duty, even if its content requires more extensive 
consideration and interpretation than does a ‘perfect’ obligation. For example, the right to 
housing, the right to education, the right to freedom of expression all produce obligations 
which affect all States and all individuals, in order to endow all citizens with the 
capabilities of beings and doings to which these rights are connected. 
 
 Even if the law (social law included) always has a structure of obligation, Lawrence 
Friedman stressed in 1971 (at the time of the civil rights struggle in the United States) that 
‘the law contains more than a collection of commands. Moreover, there are rules which 
authorise actions but do not require it – rules which supply opportunities for the exercise of 
individual initiative. They, too, are important.’ (1971:190). The right granted to a person 
constitutes a possibility. People can – or cannot – activate this right. We cannot deduce the 
use of the right from the resource of the right. A right may ‘exist’ in the sense that it is 
correctly promulgated within a legal system without at the same time automatically having 
a legal effect (for example, it may never be invoked in court). We should not immediately 
deduce from this situation that the right is not applied since ‘when an individual decides to 
take legal action it is not a question of the execution of a norm. We can no longer claim 
that the fact of not using the legal instrument is a deviation.’ (Friedman, 1971:191). 
However, we might say of such an under-used right that it is not effective. This means that 
the right does not structure the space of possibilities for citizens. In this sense, the 
effectiveness of the right does not allow itself to be reduced to the application of a norm. 
 
 This important insight is without doubt connected to comprehensive theories in the 
sociology of law. Thus, commenting on the importance of an approach to law of Weberian 
inspiration, Pierre Lascoumes and Evelyne Serverin stress the importance of treating law as 
an endogenous orientation of social activity and not as an exogenous norm. ‘From this 
point of view, the “judicial order” is seen…not as a collection of imperatives but as a 
collection of resources.’ (1995: 164). In this case, law is seen as an ‘orientation’ embedded 
in the activity of individuals. One may activate a law or not, make use of it, employ it in a 
course of action. To consider the law from the perspective of access to possible worlds is to 
treat it as a space generating multiple activities, which are self-evidently not deducible 
from the text of the law. To take a comparison from the field of linguistics, the law 
therefore resembles a Chomskian grammar: it is a collection of rules capable of generating 
an infinity of performances with unforeseeable content. The analysis of the application of 
law therefore demands an enquiry into the uses of law and the capabilities of individuals. 
 
Two meanings of rights-as-capabilities 
 
 We must distinguish between these two aspects of law - the law as orientation of 
meaning and the law as resource. The latter is equally well described by the idea of 
instrument; the former on the other hand cannot be understood as being within the order of 
instrumentality (the being-ready-to-hand which we make use of as we like) but in the order 
of meaning. 
 
 According to a first, substantive, sense (1) a right is a moral title given to citizens to 
achieve certain ends (housing oneself, feeding oneself, participating in public life, choosing 
one’s partner, etc.). It is a question of the orientation of the meaning of the action (in the 
Weberian sense), not just legally validated but also morally validated by the institutional 
world to which it belongs. According to a second, procedural, sense (2), a right is a legal 
instrument which, within an institutional setting, confers a possibility of valid action calling 
for the support of the proper authorities, that is of the executive power (government, 
administration) and of the judicial power. If the first sense can be seen as a capability – 
individual or collective – of giving a meaning to action, the second can be viewed rather as 
a capability of having available and using specific resources in order to achieve a possible 
and desirable life. As I have argued elsewhere (De Munck, 2007), both senses are implied 
in Sen’s definition of a capability. A capability is always a capability of giving meaning to 
one’s life and decisions, and a capability to use resources to realise this meaning in one’s 
real world. The structure of rights is the structure of capabilities.  
 
 These two senses demand specific analyses. In one sense, the first meaning of right 
is the stronger and the more exacting. It links the right to meaning and to value. The 
accomplishment of the right is, in this view, an infinite task. It does not only demand that 
actors conform to external rules: it supposes that the meaning of the right – that is to say, 
the reference to values that it bears – is embedded in social activity. Important 
consequences follow from this for the capabilities of citizens and legal professionals on the 
other hand. These capabilities are connected to the interpretative possibilities available to 
actors. The second meaning of rights – this time understood as resources permitting access 
to other resources – also bears considerable significance for the capabilities of individuals. 
In this case we must focus analysis on the context and on the opportunities that it offers to 
convert a right into capabilities. 
 
 From these two standpoints, the problem of a capabilities approach to rights can be 
summed up in the following way: how can we measure the space of real possibilities which 
are opened up to individual freedoms by legal institutions? How can we think about the 
support of legal instruments for the positive liberties proclaimed by rights? This kind of 
evaluation depends on considering public action from the viewpoint of the recipient and not 
from a internal point of view to the political and judicial system. The effective freedom of 
individuals is ultimately the final judge legal institutions and public action. Economic 
efficiency in the strict sense is not let out of this evaluative grid, but it is present only as a 
means to be assessed relative to other means and to substantial ends. The efficiency of 
institutions therefore requires a measure external to those which they produce by 
endogenous means. This external standard is provided by the capability set of every citizen 
in European Union.  
 
 Let’s take a concrete and specific example: the Parental Leave Directive (Directive 
96/34/EC) adopted on 3 June 1996 by the Council of Europe. This Directive sets out 
‘minimum requirements on parental leave and time off from work on grounds of force 
majeure, as an important means of reconciling work and family life and promoting equal 
opportunities and treatment between men and women.’ Parental leave is defined in the 
Directive as a non-transferable individual right granted to men and women following the 
birth or adoption of a child so that they may look after the this child during at least three 
months until a given age which may be up to eight years (clause 2). This is one of the few 
social rights established by the European Union, alongside rights to information and worker 
consultation and arrangements relating to home-working, part-time working and fixed 
contract employment. 
 
Law as orientations of meaning 
 
 Amartya Sen has never wished to neglect the values linked to rights –it is one of the 
points which distinguishes his liberalism from libertarianism. Rights space is not only a 
neutral space offering individuals the possibility of doing or not doing, of being or not 
being. They also constitute the public proclamation of a meaning, that is to say a space of 
valued possibilities. If rights discourse has acquired such a place in our democratic 
societies since the first formulations of modern natural rights it is because rights have a 
value as a proposition of meaning for the individuals who inhabit them. The proclamation 
of the right to freedom of speech is not only the public guarantee of a performance one 
might or might not wish to carry out. It is the affirmation of the central value of citizenship 
in democratic societies. It is the institutional consecration of a certain idea of the City. If 
we were to think of rights only as opportunities we would be leaving out the dimension of 
finality which is revealed in their very proclamation. We would be reducing rights to 
negative liberties (not being prevented). The rights must be considered as the expression 
and tool of positive freedoms. They are goals for a good life.  
 
 Values appear in the discourse of clarification and justification of rights. Thus, in 
adopting the text of the Parental Leave Directive, the European Union proposes frames of 
understanding and of giving value to the social world. These concern work relations, race 
relations and family relations. In effect, the category of Parental Leave acquires its 
meaning in a very general discourse, of high moral and political ambition, that reveals the 
‘considerations’ of the Directive. These ‘considerations’ are not rules or prescriptions but 
rather the ideas, or frameworks, that form the basis of and orient the rules that are to 
follow. We would be wrong to think that they have no legal effect: they make 
comprehensible the content of the provisions to which they refer. 
 
In this discourse we can distinguish four elements that form, as it were, semantic 
nuclei that interconnect multiple meanings. First, the discourse of parental leave links the 
right to parental leave to a better work-family life relationship (considerations 3 and 5 of 
the Directive). It is not therefore a matter of bluntly affirming the value of work, but of 
relativising it in what is sketched out as a pluralist conception of the different spheres of 
life. In the second place, the dimension of ‘gender’ quite obviously constitutes a second 
symbolic direction of this right. The struggle against sex discrimination (considerations 3 
and 17 of the Directive) is at the heart of the provision. The Directive proposes a parental 
leave, not just maternal leave. The difference and similarity between specific needs of men 
and women in the job market are taken into account. Third semantic nucleus: far from 
limiting itself to concerns for the sphere of outside work, and concerns to equality relating 
to work, the right to parental leave is justified by a new discourse about work in post-
industrial times. This promotes the development of new and flexible ways of organising 
work and time – in order to enhance economic competitiveness (considerations 5, 6, and 12 
of the Directive). This search for flexibility is linked to concerns for the security of workers 
on parental leave; the Directive advocates the maintenance of benefits in kind from health 
insurance during the period of leave as well as the maintenance of rights to social security 
benefits (considerations 10 and 11 of the Directive). Finally, the application of the 
Directive also has a symbolic effect on the proportion of working time in relation to 
employment. Although the Directive does not explicitly encourage the systematic 
replacement of workers on parental leave by temporary workers, the problem of replacing 
workers is mentioned in the framework agreement: the difficulty of finding a replacement 
when linked to the functioning of the business constitutes, for the employer, a justifiable 
reason for postponing the exercise of the right to parental leave. Flexible ways of 
organising work and time produce, in a systematic way, flexibility – included in this is the 
deformalisation of the categories of work and of unemployment, in so far as benefits 
payable for interruption of professional career are a matter for employment insurance (we 
will come back to this point). 
 
 In structuring the space of opportunities, the right therefore at the same time 
suggests new ways of interpreting and valuing the world as well as publicly acceptable 
reasons for choosing these opportunities. Legal institutions provide actors ways of 
behaviour and reasons for acting; they put to work the interpretative categories of actors 
who must deal with the meanings carried by the right. This symbolic efficiency is the first 
dimension we must take into account when evoking the implementation of rights. At this 
level, a right has no need to be sanctioned to be efficient. Quite the opposite, we might say, 
since the absence of legal recourse may very well signify the remarkably high level of 
effectiveness of a right whose violations are somewhat rare (just as it might signify, on the 
contrary, the symbolic and total non-effectiveness of a right). We must also rule out the 
possibility of measuring this symbolic effectiveness in any quantitative way. The symbolic 
effect is non-measurable, but, contrary to what is maintained by the positivist paralogism in 
vogue (only the measurable is real) no less real for that. It may well be that in matters of 
legal effectiveness the most fundamental reality is precisely this non-measurable effect of 
meaning. 
 
Bourdieu’s mistake 
 
 The symbolic impact of rights on the culture of a society therefore represents the 
first dimension to analyse. This idea is one familiar to sociologists, and is usually evoked 
by the concept of ‘legal socialisation’. Bourdieu used the idea when he evoked the 
symbolic violence of the State (and of the law through which it is given expression). By 
means of the law (particularly), the State, says Bourdieu, is ‘in a position to impose and 
inculcate in a universal fashion, within certain territorial limits, identical or similar 
cognitive and evaluative structures.’ (1994: 124). According to him, lawyers play an 
extremely important role in this process of domination since in order to understand the 
symbolic effectiveness of the State it is necessary to ‘examine very closely the structure of 
the legal field, bringing to light the generic interests of the groups of owners of this kind of 
cultural capital, with its tendency to function as symbolic capital, that is legal competence. 
(1994: 130). Legal socialisation, then, is simply the interiorisation by individuals of the 
objective structures of State domination. 
 
 In these remarks of Bourdieu we find a perfect example of the negative 
consequences which follow from the reduction of law to commandments. The reasons of 
law are then, by association, themselves treated as a means of inculcating, as prisons of 
thought, as violence committed by power. As a result, reasons cease to be reasons; there 
remain only ‘nominations’ and the capacity to choose is converted to habitus. 
 
 The problem with Bourdieu’s analysis is that it underestimates the equivocal nature 
and the multiplicity of meanings of law, as well as the importance of public discussion of 
norms.  Even if they wished to do so, the State and the legal professionals in its pay 
(allegedly) would have great difficulty in unifying and restricting the plurality of possible 
interpretations of the law. The resource does not determine use, the text does not determine 
its interpretation, the law does not sentence social meaning to State custody. 
 
 From the perspective of a Capability Approach, the symbolic efficiency of law does 
not depend on the capability of individuals to internalize its norms. Rather, it depends on 
the capability of individuals to inscribe the values put forward by the law within the fabric 
of reasons governing their life choices. This is not a matter of strict training by symbolic 
violence but of the construction of a sensible discussion. In other words, the right to 
parental leave becomes an effective right if it is in line, within the lifeworld, with the 
demands internal to the ideas of self-realisation which inhabit this world and which appear 
publicly acceptable within it. This encounter between legal institution and cultural 
discourses is in no sense an automatic one and, by and large, it eludes the State’s 
domination. 
 
The meaning of parental leave in context 
 
 The understanding of the right to parental leave must first of all focus on this area. 
Is it really the case that the meanings that the right to parental leave gives to flexible 
working are meanings that are shared or shareable by individuals? We might note the 
existence of powerful contextual counter-tendencies. An entire level of discourse 
assimilates flexibility to economic efficiency, to professional excellence, to work ethics, 
and not to the plurality  of valuable life spheres of activity. In addition, we might ask 
ourselves if male workers really have the capability of giving a publicly acceptable 
meaning in their own worlds to their preference for the family rather than for work. Won’t 
taking parental leave be interpreted by the employer and colleagues as a sign of lack of 
interest in professional work? As a violation of shared notions of masculinity? If the right 
to parental leave is applied in a world where the division of tasks remains profoundly 
macho and where the work ethics overwhelms all other areas of social relations then it runs 
the risk of not achieving its objectives at all and of reinforcing inequalities. 
 
 In fact, Belgian statistics for parental leave demonstrate this reality: it is used 
overwhelmingly by women. The proportion of men on parental leave was 5.5% in 2000. It 
reached 17.2% in 2005, an interesting increase, although still far from parity. The right to 
parental leave has not yet been sufficient to change the cultural and normative environment 
that frames parenthood. 
 
 All this suggest that one of the conditions for effectiveness of the right to parental 
leave lies in a cultural and political effort of making the meaning of such a right and the 
culture of individuals cohere. Without this consistance, individuals lack the effective 
capabilities to implement his (or her) rights. It may well be that citizens (on both the 
employers’ and the employees’ sides) intentionally give the right a set of meanings which 
are not foreseen. Let us bear in mind, then, this central dimension of capabilities: a right 
becomes effective if all the meanings to which it gives value are inscribed without 
inconsistance within an individual’s capabilities set for self-realisation, that is to say for 
giving the individual’s life a meaning (or, as Sen puts it, choosing a ‘project of life ‘).  
 
Rights as institutionalised access to resources 
 
 Let us now consider the right not as an orientation of meaning but as a sheer legal 
instrument in institutional settings. The effectiveness of rights is often reduced to this 
aspect. This reduction derives from an internalist theory of law, promoted by legal 
positivism. Hence we come upon a purely legal notion of the capabilities of individuals. 
This notion constitutes an indispensable component of a global theory of the capabilities of 
individuals. But it must contextualised by an understanding of ends, that is to say, of the 
reasons and of the meanings of rights (above); and by a consideration of the non-legal 
conversion factors in the implementation of rights (below).  Provided this triptych 
(meaning/legal resources/other resources) is respected, the notion merits its place in the 
capabilities approach to rights. 
 
 The right constitutes an access resource to resources. Three kinds of resource are 
made accessible by the right: statutory resources (1); financial resources (2); judicial 
resources (3). With a right such as the right to parental leave, then, comes a whole ‘toolkit’ 
which largely conditions the capabilities of individuals to make use of the right. 
 
 Before dealing with each one of these resources, we should make clear for the non-
Belgian reader that in our country the European Directive Parental Leave has been the 
subject of a complex implementation guaranteed, on the one hand, by a collective 
agreement (convention collective) at the national level and, on the other hand, by Royal 
decrees (Arrêtés royaux). This translation process involved the remarkable hybridation of 
two legal institutions: one old (the so-called “career break”) and one new (parental leave). 
The “career break” is a provision dating from 1985. It gave the right to leave the labour 
market without loosing career entitlements and without giving up rights to national 
allowances. It has been a legal measure by which the employment contract was made more 
flexible, linked to the struggle against unemployment and the steady rise in demands for 
individually-tailored careers. “New” European parental leave fits into this new post-Fordist 
institutions. The two institutions merge in the Belgian legal implementation of the 
European Directive, notably on a crucial point: with regard to remuneration, parental leave 
is included in the career break. 
 
 Very precise provisions establish the conditions for use: the age of the beneficiary’s 
child may not exceed four years, that of a handicapped child may not exceed eight years, 
that of an adopted child may not exceed eight years (four years after the date of adoption); 
the beneficiary must have worked for 12 of the 15 months preceding written notification. 
The provisions determine the maximum length (three months) and the modes of parental 
leave (full-time or part-time), depending on the sector. Three versions are offered: full-time 
parental leave for a maximum of three months; part-time leave for a maximum of six 
months; 4/5 time for a maximum of 15 months. The provisions lay out precisely the 
worker’s special protection against dismissal. They determine the worker’s social rights 
and the status during parental leave. One remarkable thing: the employment contract 
continues in force during the leave, although its execution is suspended, notably in relation 
to the acquisition of new rights linked to remuneration. 
 
 (1) Under this system the resources allocated to individuals are first of all financial. 
Since it is subsumed under the career break, the right to parental leave gives the user access 
to a small national allowance which does not replace the salary but is nevertheless 
significant. 
 
Amount standard allowance paid by ONEM during parental leave 
(2000-2005) 
 
 
 
 
Complete break Reduction to 1/2 time Reduction to 1/5 time 
- 50 years + 50 years - 50 years + 50 years 
Gross monthly amount
 
 
671.52 
 
335.,75 
 
569.52 
 
113.9 
or 153.17* 
 
227.81 
Net monthly amount
 
 
603.50 
 
278.17 
 
471.85 
 
94.37 
or 126.91* 
 
188.75 
* only for single workers (except employees of educational or federal authorities)   
 
 
 
 (2) At the statutory level, two effects deserve to be pointed out.  
 
 The first relates to the very concept of the employment contract. In suspending the 
execution of the contract without stopping it, parental leave could lead to a form of activity 
contract (Boissonnat, 1995 : 278-304) guaranteeing the continuity of employment 
irrespective of any change in job. One of its remarkable consequences, then, would be a 
result of its capability to add to other measures and create a new rule in the institutional 
space. We might perhaps speak of an “emerging rule”, more inductive than deductive, 
more reflective than determinant (in Kant’s sense), which would constitute one of the 
major mechanisms of legal innovation. If generalised, such a reflecting interpretation of the 
measure could give genuine new capabilities to the worker.  
 
 The second effect relates to the area of social security. Here again we note the 
conjunction of two institutions which are, on the face of it, very distinct: social insurance 
agencies and the employment contract. The payment of “career-break” allowances is 
actually managed by the unemployment allowance office (of the National Employment 
Office)! Here, then, we find the unemployment insurance budget called on to finance the 
increased flexibility, rather than the interruption, of the employment contract. As ever, one 
example can stand for many and the process could spread: the capability of workers to 
enjoy allowances not directly linked to effective work opens the door, perhaps, to ‘social 
drawing rights’ (Supiot et al., 2001 : 222), ensuring the management of transitions (as 
specialists in ‘transitional markets’ say, cfr. Schmid and Gazier, 2002). 
 
 (3) Third, and finally, the right to parental leave goes along with a right to legal 
recourse. We might say that this is the only resource directly created by the European 
Directive itself (it does not provide for any of the financial or statutory resources we have 
just outlined, which appear only in the context of the Directive’s implementation in Belgian 
law). This right of recourse has been used on several occasions. Judgements in the courts 
and tribunals have produced a precise definition of the Belgian version of the right to 
parental leave. 
 
 These financial, statutory and legal resources are therefore made available by the 
Belgian system’s transposition of the Directive and by the Directive itself. But these 
resources constitute only possible uses of the right to parental leave. Their conversion into 
real achievements depends on many factors. 
 
 Individuals first need to be aware of these rights. This requires more than the 
existence of written laws: the information must be disseminated, repeated, implemented in 
exemplary cases that are well known to the public. In the course of their enquiries, 
sociologists often note that individuals – and even businesses, or entire economic sectors – 
have no awareness of the legal resources that are available to them. It is also necessary that 
support in claiming rights should be available: within the legal system there is the crucial 
question of access, both material and symbolic, to justice; in the sphere of public action 
there is the question of the existence of collective effort – political, by voluntary 
organisations, by the media – towards claiming rights. From this perspective, the 
intermediary agents and settings are crucial for the effectiveness of rights. Finally, it is 
necessary that claiming rights does not endanger the situation of individuals who do so. 
Claiming rights can actually result in conflict. Conflict can be very costly, materially, 
socially, psychologically. Fulfilment of rights does depend on the right alone; the inventory 
of legal resources is not sufficient to account for the effectiveness of rights. We must 
therefore turn to contextual conversion factors. 
 
Non-legal conversion factors of rights 
 
 If we take an overview of the uses of parental leave in Belgium we are immediately 
struck by an astonishing contrast: the use of parental leave is significantly lower in 
Wallonia and in Brussels than it is in Flanders. In 2005, 72% of those on parental leave 
were resident in Flanders, 22.4% in Wallonia and 5.6% in Brussels. We should, though, 
note that this disparity has narrowed since 2000. And, of the 27,352 individuals estimated 
as the annual average in Belgium for 2005, 58.4% were women resident in Flanders. 
However, we should note that the proportion of men on parental leave is (and always has 
been) larger in Flanders, amounting to 18.9% in 2005. 
 
Parental leave: 
breakdown by year and by Region (%) 
 
 
 Brussels RegionFlanders  Wallonia Total  
2000 4.5 75.3 23.7 100.0 
2001 5.0 73.0 21.9 100.0 
2002 5.8 72.4 21.8 100.0 
2003 5.6 72.4 22.0 100.0 
2004 5.7 72.0 22.3 100.0 
2005 5.6 72.0 22.4 100.0 
 
Source: ONEM (annual average of individuals)   
 
 
 How can we explain such a regional disparity within the same national system? We 
can present some hypotheses on the factors which enable the Flemish to convert their rights 
into effective leave more easily than do the inhabitants of the Brussels Region or of 
Wallonia. 
 
1) the family as conversion factor: in terms of the structure of the population, Flanders has 
58.1% of households with children. We also note that the Brussels Region is characterised 
by an overrepresentation of single mothers, particularly of single mothers with two or more 
children. A statistical report remarks that ‘while Brussels households account for only 11% 
of Belgian households, 13% of all single mothers live in the Brussels Region. With regard 
to single women with three or more children, this figure rises to 15%. Nearly 10% of single 
fathers live in the Brussels Region. Nearly one third of mothers in the Brussels Region are 
single (29%, compared to 14.4% in Flanders and 21.8% in Wallonia). 5.7% of fathers in 
Brussels are single (compared to 3.5% in Flanders and 4.7% in Wallonia).’ (OBMTQ, 
2004: 15). Household composition in Wallonia seems to be somewhere between that of 
Flanders and that of the Brussels Region. We may assume that the close Flemish family 
constitutes a favourable conversion factor for maternal parental leave since it allows a 
continuity of income unattainable in single-parent families. 
 
2) the employment market as conversion factor: unemployment rates are highest in the 
Brussels Region, activity rates are lowest in Wallonia, employment rates are highest in 
Flanders. Competition in the employment market is therefore not standard across the whole 
of Belgium. The risk of losing one’s job is markedly higher in the Brussels Region and in 
Wallonia than it is in Flanders, which may explain a hesitancy with regard to career breaks, 
even if temporary. 
 
 
Employment rate, activity rate and unemployment rate by sex 
and region of residence (year 2004) 
 
 
 Brussels Region Flanders Wallonia Belgium 
M F T M F T M F T M F T 
Activity rate * 72.1 56.7 64.3 75.1 60.7 68.0 70.8 54.4 62.6 73.4 58.2 65.9 
Employment rate ** 60.3 47.9 54.1 71.6 56.7 64.3 63.2 46.9 55.1 67.9 52.7 60.3 
Unemployment rate *** 16.3 15.4 15.9 4.6 6.6 5.4 10.7 13.8 12.1 7.6 9.6 8.5 
Source: INS-EFT  
* Activity rate: active population/total population  
** Employment rate: population in work/total population  
*** Unemployment rate: unemployed ILO/active population  
 
  
3) Regional allowance as a supplementary resource: we should also mention an additional 
allowance of 100 euros paid by the government of Flanders to those who choose parental 
leave (on condition that they are Belgian and reside in Flanders). Inhabitants of Wallonia 
and Brussels do not benefit from similar advantages. 
 
 
Going beyond the magic concept of the law  
 
 A magical concept of rights – and law in general – prevails in matters of public 
action: a law simply has to exist for reality to be automatically transformed. Attached to 
this concept is a ‘platonic’ concept of political action: politics consists of making laws. The 
production of norms would therefore be sufficient to produce a European politics. Also 
linked to it is a certain vision of the control of effectiveness: the only important thing, in 
this perspective, is the translation of European legal standards into national legal texts. The 
Commission and European judges only have to oversee the correct implementation of this 
legalistic work in the member states. Everything else is a matter of subsidiarity.  
 
 A capabilities approach reveals the imposture of this magical concept of law. Such 
an ‘internalist’ point of view of the legal system is extremely inadequate in accounting for 
the effectiveness of a right. If the furtherance of rights truly becomes a political orientation 
of the European Union, if rights are considered as ‘goals’ (as Sen says, 1985), much more 
is needed than simply controlling the legislative translation of texts. 
 
 It would first be necessary to take into account the multiple intermediations of law 
(De Munck, 2006). At the symbolic level, the right to Parental Leave opens a space of 
intermediation which can undoubtedly prove fertile and clearly progressive. It could play a 
part in reconfiguring the meaning of work and of the family. And it is in this regard that it 
could be, in the end, the most innovative: it opens up new possible worlds to the 
imagination of Europeans since it broadens the range of publicly recognised life choices. 
But that supposes a huge cultural task of interpretation, as much in the strictly legal sphere 
as in the lifeworld of Europeans. This task necessarily consists in discussion and 
communication involving trades unions, agencies, city councils, etc. It is the political, 
legal, associational and administrative intermediaries who hold the key to the statutory 
interpretations and reinterpretations of a measure such as parental leave. 
 
 What holds true for the law as value also holds true for the law as resource. Even 
under a system as ‘social’ as the Belgian one, the resources offered by the law are 
insufficient to equalise the capabilities of enjoying a right such as the right to parental 
leave. The effective use of these resources calls for a narrow political and social mapping 
guaranteeing all citizens access to these resources. This is to say that the involvement of 
organised civil society in European politics is one of the conditions for the effectiveness of 
the rights which it proclaims.  
 
 Second, it would be necessary to dare to question the sacrosanct principle of 
subsidiarity; it now constitutes an obstacle to a European politics of rights. For example, 
we have seen how far the existence of an allowance is a determining factor in individuals’ 
use of the right to parental leave; and, as a result, how much it contributes to inequalities 
within the same Belgian system. What then are we to think of inequalities in claiming the 
right to parental leave at the level of the whole of Europe? The creation of a European 
parental leave fund, which would give a substantial income replacement allowance to all 
Europeans who chose to use it, would be a genuine equalising measure and a strong gesture 
towards creating individual capabilities on the labour market. Without being sufficient, this 
measure would at least have the merit of making a significant contribution both to the fight 
against inequalities among Europeans and to opening up the choice of possible worlds 
during their lifetimes. The production of a Directive ‘unequipped’ with such a provision 
has been a first step, but it will become a mere cosmetic social measure if a second step is 
not taken in this direction. Then the European project, currently bogged down in the 
discourse of necessity and the reduction of the possible, might once again become a project 
of opening up new possible worlds – that is to say, a project of freedom. 
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1
 The implementation of the Directive 96/34/CE was effected in Belgium by means of collective agreement 
and by legal instruments: on the one hand, the creation of the collective working agreement n°64 of the 
Conseil National du Travail establishing a right to parental leave (29/04/1997); on the other hand, the Royal 
Decree of 29 October 1997 regarding the introduction of a right to parental leave within the framework of a 
career break (applicable to the private sector), the Royal Decrees of 07/05/1999, 26/05/1999 and 04/06/1999 
(applicable to the public sector), the Royal Decree of 04/06/1999 (applicable to the teaching sector),  and the 
Royal Decree of 10/06/2002 (applicable to public organisations). 
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